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JOINED AT THE HIP:
SIMONE WEIL, QUENTIN MEILLASSOUX
Stephanie Strickland
“We have to believe in a God who is like the true God in everything, except that 
he does not exist, for we have not reached the point where God exists.” 
Simone Weil, Notebooks1
“To solve the dilemma requires the thesis of  the divine inexistence, the very title of  
Meillassoux’s still withheld major book. In a useful play on words, he notes that 
this phrase has two meanings. It refers to the inexistence of  the divine, but also to 
the divine character of  this inexistence….”
Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, Philosophy in the Making2
Two severely clear stylists, in passionate pursuit of  the real, unflinching, 
tough-minded, scrupulous;
both respectful of  science as a chain of  complex descriptions (not reasons) 
that attests to the world’s current and temporary order, but not sharing the 
truly privileged relation that mathematics has to reality;
both having written serious critical works about poems that confront ca-
tastrophe: 
Simone Weil’s homage, “The Iliad, or The Poem of  Force,” interrogating 
not force, but a feeling for μεταξύ/metaxu, bridges to a good beyond force, 
saying in her Notebooks: “The Iliad: this draws a picture of  God’s absence”;3
Religion & Literature74
Quentin Meillassoux’s decipherment, The Number and the Siren, interrogating 
Mallarmé’s quest to determine a poetry “capable of  emancipating itself  from 
the sole regime of  representation, a poetry worthy to rival the Eucharist 
and the ‘real presence’ of  the Passion in the host”;4 worthy as well to extend 
the heritage of  poetry as counted, in Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard 
through a strategy involving number and a wager on number, a strategy 
that has clearly informed Meillassoux’s own work; 
my contention in bringing these two into a Collision is that they are joined 
at the hip. 
According to the editors of  Evental Aesthetics, a Collision is “[a] new genre 
of  speculative writing…that introduces philosophical questions…not a full-
fledged argument but the potential of  an argument…an encounter that is 
also a point of  departure: the impact of  a striking confrontation between 
experience, thought, and writing [which] may propel later inquiries into 
being.” 
How inaccessible Weil and Meillassoux are! The effort to recover and edit 
her texts, 100 years past Weil’s birth, is still not concluded. The part of  her 
work dealing with mathematics is ignored; 21 pages of  calculations are ex-
cised from First and Last Notebooks. Meillassoux is self-censoring. His presumed 
masterwork-to-be, The Inexistent Divine, appears only as a condensation (about 
20 percent) of  an early version, translated by a generous rival. For both, one 
must cite notebooks, interviews, transcribed lectures; the published oeuvre is 
often self-revising; the writers do not shy from creating their own vocabulary.
But both are devoted to reason: they prize it above all else until forced, by 
reason, to a limit-concept, in her case Mystery and in his Contingency. Both 
uphold the principle of  non-contradiction. Both are driven in the end to 
Cantor. In both, a kind of  reversal or affirmation of  paradox prevails.
Weil claims that “God’s absence is the divine form of  presence which cor-
responds to evil—an absence that is felt. (Anyone who has not felt God’s 
presence in him is incapable of  feeling His absence.)… It depends on Man 
that God should be able to traverse Creation from end to end and pass to 
the farthest extremity, which is the extremity of  evil,”5 an account that needs 
unpacking in her stories and her concept of  decreation. 
She says, “Affliction…deprives…victims…of  their personality and turns 
them into things…. They will never again believe that they are anyone. 
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Affliction would not have this power without the element of  chance…”6 
“Suffering has no significance. There lies the very essence of  its reality. We 
must love it in its reality, which is the absence of  significance. Otherwise 
we do not love God.”7
Meillassoux’s Contingency is neither chance nor the improbable—those 
concepts rely on an idea that Cantor’s thought rules out. Nothing can bound 
Contingency, nor contain its anarchic possibilities which include every 
form of  order. Contingency prescribes Hyperchaos, a non-physical time 
accommodating every state of  reality. Contingency requires the existence 
of  concrete, empirical things, “since it is because things are like this or that 
(red, round and with an individual redness or roundness) that they could be 
other, or could not be.”8 The primary consequence of  Contingency is that 
nothing (no state, no being, no law) is necessary, a supreme un-grounding of  
being. Contingency is all-powerful, but for this: it cannot produce a neces-
sary entity. It, alone, is necessary. 
For most, this state of  affairs seems disturbing, but Meillassoux hails it: “For 
no reason” is a genuine answer. The absence of  a why-for is not “a limit 
that thought encounters in its search for the ultimate…” but rather “is…
the ultimate…”9 welcomed reversal: “everything and every world is without 
reason, and is thereby capable of actually becoming otherwise without reason.”10 
Weil’s take on the absence of  a why: “Affliction constrains a man to ask 
continually ‘why?’ the question to which there is essentially no reply. So by 
means of  it we hear the non-reply.”11
Contingency as sole eternal ruler of  the world is close to Weil’s Necessity, 
a morally indifferent chain upon Creation. Crucial here is her view that 
Creation is itself  a crucifixion, a Passion. “Because he is the Creator, God is 
not all-powerful. Creation is abdication,”12 or more precisely, abandonment. 
The abdication is voluntary, but not rescindable. Like a giant constrained 
by oath in folktales, or the hero who has hidden his heart elsewhere in some 
ill-fitting casket or wooden chest, God’s abandonment has created us. If  he 
did not abandon us, we would not exist, “for if  we were exposed to [his] 
direct radiance…we should be evaporated like water in the sun.”13
Meillassoux envisions things crashing in and out of  existence more read-
ily than Weil does, but she is clear that there is no reason for things to be 
as they are other than that they are; she speaks of  “the indifference of  all 
things…even Christ’s crucifixion is no more charged with significance than 
is a pine-needle which falls to the ground; God wants all things that are to 
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an equal degree.”14
Both feel acutely the misery or affliction of  mankind—and both feel a need 
to produce or seek an honest fervor to combat demoralization. Meillassoux 
wants to “escape being paralyzed by an impossible mourning for the atroci-
ties of  the twentieth century, and…to avoid the totalitarian temptation of  
collective action” while “confronting the despair that results from the indif-
ference of  the world to my moral ends.”15 He mentions specific “specters,” 
the unmourned victims of  genocide, famine, and epidemic. Weil’s purview is 
wider: “[V]iolence obliterates anybody who feels its touch. It comes to seem 
just as external to its employer as to its victim. And from this springs the idea 
of  a destiny before which executioner and victim stand equally innocent, 
before which conquered and conqueror are brothers in the same distress.”16
For Meillassoux, unlike most of  the object-oriented ontologists he is linked 
to, humans are uniquely valuable. The singular nature of  the human is to 
understand and want justice, though no experience of  this world supports 
such an expectation. All humans, as individuals, possess an identical value. 
For Simone Weil, this value is founded on the equalizing cry, why is this hap-
pening to me? For her, all possess from birth the expectation that good will be 
done to them, a feeling of  unjustness if  it is not. Meillassoux extends this 
by saying, “Hence those who exercise their humanity…can only hope for 
the recommencement of  our lives in such a way that justice would surpass 
the factual death that has struck down our fellow humans.”17
Both insist that all, living or dead, must have an equal chance at resurrec-
tion/redemption. Meillassoux, under the influence of  Badiou, Mallarmé, 
and Poe, seeks evental uniqueness. Speaking of  Coup de dés, he says: “The 
shipwreck sends out only one message before sinking—Christ knew only 
one crucifixion and one resurrection. Imagine the Son of  God…undergo-
ing once more the agony of  the cross: This would no longer be a Passion, 
but a comedy of  repetition…. The beauty of  the gesture consists in its 
unparalleled nature…. Its uniqueness is evental, not arithmetical.”18 On a 
point in which she disagrees with Meillassoux, Weil claims that all do, and 
did, have an equal chance: “…Christianity did not begin with Christ.”19  
“[T]he redemption is continued in the person of  all those who, either before 
or after his birth, have imitated the Christ.”20
Meillassoux imagines a “fourth” World of  Justice—no, he does not imagine 
it. He has understood Contingency as the rationale for hope of  a new world 
that transgresses every limit of  the present. The only limits that concern 
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him, however, are those that affect the nature of  human consciousness. The 
ordering is based on advents newly arising, not contained in embryo in prior 
arrangements, though requiring the presence of  all prior “Worlds.” Thus, 
Matter leverages the fluctuations of  the Void; Life brings sensation, percep-
tion, affection, and inter-being resonance to Matter; Thought attains for 
Life—through being able to think its own death—concepts of  the infinite, 
the eternal, truth, the transfinite, and mathematics. 
What is an equivalent rupture with regard to Thought? Not perfection of  
mind (in Meillassoux’s view mind achieves its limit when it understands 
Contingency); no, the relevant novelty is Justice for all requiring resurrec-
tion of  the dead. The Fourth World must be doubly conditioned, in almost 
exactly the same sense that God is awaited in Simone Weil’s narrations. One 
is powerless to cause justice to arrive, or to make oneself  experience God. Weil 
believes if  two people have no experience of  God, the one who denies him 
is closer to him. We cannot look for God if  we have had no experience of  
him. All we can do is refuse the name of  God to whatever is not God (God-
good as an emerald is green) and wait for him to find us. These value-laden 
events cannot occur if  they are not attentively awaited—by Meillassoux, 
with hope newly made rational and real in Contingency; by Weil, with a 
turning-toward, a patient close attentive waiting, a willingness to abandon 
self  in a loving act reciprocal to the abandonment that Creation involved. 
These two stories enjoin a similar behavior on the living. 
For Meillassoux religious (as opposed to philosophical) waiting means to 
desire the inhuman, the perfection and power of  elsewhere; but for Weil, 
religious and philosophical waiting end in unexpected personal encounter, 
“the smile on a beloved face.”21 Both writers put forward elaborate scenarios, 
both clear that Creation cannot become divine without human participa-
tion, and both telling what I will call Symbol Stories. 
Symbols serve as a method of  future recognition; originally a broken token, 
part of  a hospitality tablet which, fitted together, in the future serves as in-
troduction. Meillassoux views the symbol as a link between being and value. 
For him, the major symbols of  the Western world are the Greek Heavenly 
Spheres, replaced by a Rousseauian trust in organic Life and Nature, in 
turn replaced by the near-divinization of  History in Hegel and Marx. For 
Weil, “Christianity tried to discover a harmony in history. This is the germ 
in Hegel, and consequently Marx. The notion of  history as being a directed 
continuity is Christian. It seems to me there are few more completely false 
ideas than this.”22 For Meillassoux, this “ruse of  history…as autonomous 
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entity…whose own becoming depends on no individual thought or action 
but which leads us towards emancipation none the less…”23 is absurd. Any 
movement of  History said to be bound to arrive at justice contravenes his 
basic assertion of  necessary contingency, as well as falsely posing a “principle 
of  process…as the actual accomplishment” of  its goal.24 For both Weil and 
Meillassoux singular humans are not monadic individuals subject to statisti-
cal treatment, but afflicted lives charged with memories of  past injustice. 
Meillassoux wants a new symbolization, value inserted into a reality identi-
fied with lawless change. Weil is more inclusive. She thinks that “by read-
ing…symbolism the soul ceases to be overwhelmed by continually reading 
force in matter.”25 She agrees with Meillassoux that ethics ruled by symbol is 
not the deepest ethics, but she finds symbols, analogons, stories, metaxu of  
every sort, pedagogically productive and would like to see them enshrined 
in ritual (as would Mallarmé). She says, “A method is necessary for the un-
derstanding of  images, symbols, etc. One should not try to interpret them, 
but contemplate them until their significance declares itself…. It is preferable 
to take the risk of  taking them too literally than insufficiently so.”26
Though each of  them honors individuals, as the centers of  all value, they are 
also engaged in teaching a long process of  decentering and decreation. For 
Meillassoux, humans after becoming central through the Void-to Matter-
to Life-to Thought advents, embark upon a long process of  de-centering, 
thinking their death, their non-necessity, thinking existence beyond them 
in every direction, at every time-scale, thinking themselves out of  central 
position in the non-All of  universes/multiverses that cannot be counted. 
Weil’s note: “[Folklore—a princess who becomes a servant; the only way of  
convincing people that a servant is a human being.] Impulse analogous to 
that of  incarnation; emptying oneself  of  one’s false divinity.”27
Both writers believe they can reach the absolute via mathematical methods: 
for her mediation, for him operationalism. 
For Meillassoux, in math thought thinks its own absence, because math is a 
proliferation of  meaningless signs. “Whereas the meaningful sign is forgot-
ten in favor of  its meaning and its reference, the meaningless sign, given 
ultimately for itself, as pure sign, makes me accede to its pure gratuitousness, 
to its pure absence of  necessity; to the fact that anything whatsoever could 
fulfill its task just as well as it does. So that it is indeed the non-foundation 
of  all beings, and not of  the sign alone, that discreetly reveals itself  in this 
in-significance.”28
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For Weil, “Mathematics [is] the ability to reason in a vigorous fashion 
concerning the non-representable,”29 an “action in which there is nothing 
to manipulate except signs.”30 It is the realm of  rigorous demonstration as 
invented by Greeks who wanted more than serviceable accounting and 
surveying; they wanted truth, eternal, real, cosmic, divine. What this task 
required was extreme attention and, in her view, “the only form of  extreme 
attention is a religious one.”31 “That part of  mathematics which concerns 
diverse orders of  infinities (theory of  wholes, topology) contains a treasury 
of  infinitely precious images which can be applied to supernatural truths.”32
Weil notes that “In ‘Cantor’s Paradise’ the mind has got to be very much 
clearer, more exact and intuitive than anywhere else…. The distinction to 
be made between levels is something of  the utmost importance…. The 
relation between the whole and the part… The different forms of  demon-
stration…. The method of  proof in mathematics…. Analogical utilization of  
the notion of  transfinitude.”33 The meaning of  transfinitude, here, is Can-
tor’s demonstration that a Totality-holding-All cannot exist. Any purported 
Whole-that-holds-All can be shattered and exceeded by a larger One made 
from the combined subsets of  the original Whole. And there is no end to 
this process. 
Both focus on the meaning of  relationship. Weil says, “A point is infinitely 
small, is nothing at all, in comparison with a volume. And yet it is a point 
which, if  sustained [center of  gravity], abolishes the entire weight of  the 
volume; and it does that simply as a result of  its position. The reason is that 
this point contains a relationship. A relationship between places is not one 
of  spatial extent; it cannot occupy a place, but only a point.”34 Boxed and 
set out on her Notebook page: “With regard to any order whatever, a higher 
order—therefore something infinitely above it—can only be represented in 
that order by something infinitely small.”35
She notes, “Ratio conceived without the aid of  the senses, and as certain 
as number.”36 On one side of  a drawn column, she writes “God mediator 
between,” and in the adjoining column “God and God, God and man, 
Man and man, God and things, One thing and another thing, Myself  
and myself ” and completes this thought with the sentence “God is media-
tion and, in itself, everything is divine mediation. Analogically, for human 
thought, everything is ratio.”37 She understands the “privileged role of  the 
intelligence…comes from the fact that the nature of  intelligence consists in 
this, that it is something which becomes obliterated from the very fact that it 
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is exercised. I can make an effort to make my way toward truths, but when 
they are there before me, they are, and I have nothing to do in the matter.”38
For Meillassoux, “What is specific to a formal axiomatic [is that] one does 
not begin with any initial definition…one posits relations between terms 
that themselves are not defined…. These terms are named as sets: but to 
name them…is not to define them.” “These axioms are not ‘definitions in dis-
guise’….it is an entirely other matter, a matter of  the substitution of  a relation 
for a definition.”39 “Mathematics is thus not reality itself, but the language 
which—by virtue of  its set-theoretical structure articulating non-totalities 
and of  its syntax of  signs devoid of  meaning—can meaningfully refer to the 
in-itself  of  hyper-chaotic reality.”40 “In fact mathematics…are the strange 
possibility to speak about a world…without thinking or life. Mathematics 
are the possibility of  coming back…from death’s realm.”41
Interestingly posed against mathematics, the language of  access to the dead 
and indifferent truth of  lawless Contingency, is Weil’s view of  “certain 
words” which “…refer to an absolute perfection which we cannot conceive. 
Since the proper use of  these words involves not trying to make them fit 
any conception, it is in the words themselves, as words, that the power to 
enlighten…resides. That they express [alternatively, What they express] is 
beyond our conception. God and truth are such words; also justice, love, and 
good. It is dangerous to use words of  this kind. They are like an ordeal.”42
Meillassoux and Weil, inaccessible thinkers, are joined at the hip through 
the ordeal of  these phrases and thoughts: 
absence as the divine form of  presence








poems that confront catastrophe
reality which is the absence of  significance
reason




We are left to parse them in light of  the strenuous commitment of  both think-
ers to a justice that wants to come to every past, present, and future event. 
New York, New York
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